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Abstract
We examine forward guidance in a small open economy New Key-
nesian model. In a setup where forward guidance duration is known
with certainty, we show that the elasticity of inflation with respect
to the real exchange rate is a key variable in attenuating the forward
guidance puzzle. Then we consider a credible forward guidance regime
which is adopted stochastically, in normal times or under a liquidity
trap. Compared to closed economy, forward guidance turns out to be
more expansionary in open economy and the real exchange rate is a
key variable driving this result. In particular, the response of output
and inflation is amplified when aggregate supply is negatively related
to the real exchange rate.
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1 Introduction
The global financial crisis has triggered a vivid interest in theoretical and
empirical research on unconventional monetary policies that look for a sub-
stitute of the short-term nominal rate when the latter reaches the zero lower
bound. A key example of such unconventional policies is given by forward
guidance, through which policymakers announce a path of the nominal in-
terest rate starting immediately or in the future for a particular duration.
Through this policy, the central bank tries to manage expectations of the
future policy rates once the zero lower bound is no longer binding in order
to influence macroeconomic dynamics. In the basic New Keynesian DSGE
model, an anticipated change in the policy rate produces an effect on output
which is independent of the duration and timing: this is the forward guid-
ance puzzle. As a consequence, the effects of a temporary variation in the
policy rate that takes place very far in the future is the same if the variation
were to take place immediately or in the near future. This puzzle, discussed
by Del Negro et al. (2012), Carlstrom et al. (2015) and McKay et al. (2016),
derives from the fact that, in a baseline New Keynesian DSGE model, the
dynamic IS relationship has no discounting of the expected output gap and,
in turn, of future real interest rates. Consequently, the literature introduced
some discounting mechanism in the Euler equation so that aggregate demand
responds less than one-to-one to its future expected changes. Examples in-
clude an overlapping-generations structure à la Blanchard and Yaari in the
demand side (Del Negro et al. (2012)), heterogeneous agents and incomplete
markets (McKay et al. (2016)), sticky information (Carlstrom et al. (2015)).
McClung (2020) shows that a regime characterized by passive monetary pol-
icy and active fiscal policy does not imply forward guidance puzzle. With
active fiscal policy, Ricardian equivalence does not hold and agents perceive
government debt as net wealth. As a consequence, forward guidance an-
nouncements that lower the expectations of future interest rates produce
negative wealth effects that counteract the monetary stimulus.
In this paper we analyze the theoretical implications of forward guidance
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in small open economy, focusing on the international transmission of such
a policy. To the best of our knowledge, Gaĺı (2020) is the only theoreti-
cal contribution about forward guidance in open economy. He shows that
if the home central bank announces an increase (decrease) of the nominal
interest rate of T periods, with no reaction from the foreign central bank,
the exchange rate appreciation (depreciation) at the time of announcement
is proportional to the duration and the size of the interest rate change, but
it is independent on the duration of the forward guidance. Therefore for-
ward guidance puzzle arises also in a small-open economy model. We follow
Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Leitemo and Söderström (2008) in modeling
a small country that freely trades with the rest of the world, constituted of
a continuum of foreign economies. We evaluate the forward guidance policy
in normal times and under a liquidity trap, induced by a negative shock to
the natural rate, which will be the only shock present in our model. Forward
guidance will be analyzed in a deterministic scenario, where its duration is
known with certainty, and in a stochastic setting, modeled along the lines of
Bilbiie (2019).
Our main results are the following ones. First, we show the analytical
conditions that guarantee that the forward guidance puzzle does not hold in
open economy. A key determinant for eliminating the puzzle is the elastic-
ity of inflation with respect to the real exchange rate which could be either
positive or negative. To that extent, an exchange rate depreciation increases
consumer prices and therefore reduces households’ purchasing power. The
optimal labor supply choice will imply higher wages and, in turn, higher
marginal costs and inflation. However, after an exchange rate depreciation,
aggregate consumption could fall because imported goods are more expen-
sive. In the latter case, the marginal rate of substitution then falls, leading
to lower real wages and marginal cost. Our results point out that, for some
empirically plausible values of the elasticity that determine a negative rela-
tionship between inflation and real exchange rate, we do not have forward
guidance puzzle. Second, exchange rate pass-through in the Phillips curve is
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positively associated with the expansionary effects of forward guidance also
in a stochastic setup, where the duration of the policy and the state of the
economy (“normal times” versus liquidity trap) follow a Markov chain. Fi-
nally, compared to the closed-economy counterpart, forward guidance tends
to be more expansionary in open economy: this is due to the combination
the role played by the real exchange rate and to the better trade off between
output and inflation (because of a larger Phillips’ curve slope).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the reference model,
while Section 3 derives the analytical conditions for the presence of the puzzle
in a deterministic setup, varying the frictions in international financial mar-
kets. In Section 4 we study stochastic forward guidance before concluding in
Section 5. Appendix A provides some tedious computation not reported in
the main text.
2 The model
We shortly summarize, with some slight changes in notation, the small open
economy model of Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Leitemo and Söderström
(2008). With the objective of deriving analytical solutions, the only shock
(defined later) is a preference shock that drives the economy into a liquidity
trap.
The small domestic country freely trades with the rest of the world (for-
eign country), constituted of a continuum of foreign economies. We assume
that foreign and domestic countries share preferences and technology. Do-
mestic and foreign firms produce traded consumption goods, using labor as
the sole input. Households derive their utility from consuming both domestic
and foreign goods, and have a marginal decreasing disutility in labor supply
to firms.
Denoting by et the log-linearized real exchange rate, we have by definition
et = st + p
f
t − pt, (1)
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with st being the nominal exchange rate (units of domestic currency against
one unit of foreign currency), pft the price level of the goods produced in the
foreign country and pt the price level of domestically produced goods.
The real exchange rate is directly related to the inflation rate in the
domestic goods sector, πt, via the New Keynesian Phillips curve:
1
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt − φet, (2)
where xt denotes the output gap, 0 < β < 1 the discount factor, and Et
the rational expectations formed by private agents (conditional on informa-
tion set available at time t). The composite parameter κ = κ̂(η + σ) κ̂ ≡
(1−ϑ)(1−ϑβ)
ϑ
is the output-gap elasticity of inflation and encompasses the ef-
fect of the output gap on inflation via real marginal costs. Phillips’ curve
slope depends on ϑ, the share of firms that do not optimally adjust but
simply update in period t their previous price by the steady-state inflation
rate, on η, which represents the steady-state Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
and on σ ≡ σ̂
1−ω
with σ̂ denoting the inverse of the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution, and 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1 the share of foreign goods in domestic
consumption. The real exchange rate enters the Phillips curve through the
coefficient φ = ωκ̂ [(2− ω)ζσ − 1], where ζ stands for the elasticity of sub-
stitution across domestic and foreign goods. The economic intuition behind
the relationship between inflation and real exchange rate is the following:
when households choose labor supply, they care about the purchasing power
of their wage deflated by the consumer price index that also includes prices
of imported goods, implying that the equilibrium wage and hence the real
marginal costs depend on the real exchange rate. As highlighted in Leitemo
and Söderström (2008), there are two competing effects shaping the relation-
1Differently from Gali and Monacelli (2005), Leitemo and Söderström (2008) derive a
Phillips curve including the real exchange rate. For the microfoundations of the model,
see Leitemo and Söderström (2008). Notice that πt is different from the inflation rate
of the consumer price index that also takes into account the inflation of foreign goods
consumed by residents. In the closed economy, πt represents both producer and consumer
price inflation rates.
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ship between exchange rate and inflation. On the one hand, an exchange
rate depreciation (i.e. an increase in the exchange rate) increases consumer
prices and therefore reduces households’ purchasing power. The optimal la-
bor supply choice will imply higher wages and, in turn, higher marginal costs
and inflation. On the other hand, an exchange rate depreciation leads to a
decrease in the demand for imports and therefore a reduction in aggregate
consumption. The marginal rate of substitution then falls, leading to lower
real wages and marginal cost. The composite parameter φ is positive as long
as (2 − ω)ζσ > 1: this condition holds in Leitemo and Söderström (2008),
determining a negative relationship between inflation and exchange rate for
their model calibrated to Sweden. However, for economies whose main ex-
ports are based on price competitiveness, generally the first effect dominates
and an exchange rate depreciation induces higher inflation, which reduces
domestic consumption. For instance, (Mihailov et al., 2011) show that for
Spain a currency depreciation increases the possibility to export at the cost
of a lower purchasing power for consumers. In general, there is not unani-
mous consensus about the sign of the relationship. Differently from Leitemo
and Söderström (2008), Walsh (1999) and Razin and Yuen (2002) obtain a
positive relationship between these two variables in theoretical models, while
the estimates of Phillips curve in Mihailov et al. (2011) show that inflation
can be either positively or negatively correlated with the expected change
in the real exchange rate with the coefficients ranging from -0.26 to 0.47 for
different European countries. Therefore, in our analysis we will consider both
signs in the relationship.
The New Keynesian IS equation is given by
xt = Etxt+1 − σ−1(rt − Etπt+1) + σ−1ρt − δ (Etet+1 − et) , (3)
where rt is the nominal short-term interest rate, ρt represents an exogenous
disturbance that moves the natural interest rate, and δ a composite param-
eter defined by δ ≡ 1
σ
[
Ω
(1−ω)
− 1
]
with Ω ≡ (1 − ω) [(1− ω) + (2− ω)ωζσ].
The composite parameter δ is the elasticity of the output gap with respect
6
to the expected change in the real exchange rate, reflecting the substitution
effect induced by such a change on the demand of domestically produced
goods.2 Also with respect to the output gap, there are two competing effects
of exchange rate movement. On the one hand, an exchange rate deprecia-
tion increases consumer prices and reduces expected inflation; the resulting
increase in the real interest rate reduces consumption and the output gap,
given the expected future exchange rate. On the other hand, the exchange
rate depreciation increases export demand, and therefore output. As shown
in Leitemo and Söderström (2008), the same condition shown above for φ
determines the type of relationship between exchange rate and output gap
indirectly through the Phillips curve; φ determines whether a country would
export more following a depreciation of its national currency.
Finally, the real UIP condition relates the real interest rate differential
with the expected rate of real depreciation:
rt − Etπt+1 = Etet+1 − et, (4)
where foreign variables are set to zero for simplicity. In the baseline version
of the model, we will consider the simple UIP relationship, before introducing
some frictions in terms of risk premiums or portfolio adjustments a la Wieland
(2012).
3 Forward Guidance puzzle in open economy
One of the main results obtained in the literature is the so-called forward
guidance puzzle, through which an anticipated change in the policy rate pro-
duces an effect on output which is independent of the duration and timing:
this is the forward guidance puzzle. As a consequence, the effects of a tem-
porary variation in the policy rate that takes place very far in the future
is the same if the variation were to take place immediately or in the near
2Note that Ω and δ are positive for (2− ω)ζσ > 1.
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future. This puzzle derives from the fact that, in a baseline New Keynesian
DSGE model, the dynamic IS relationship has no discounting of the expected
output gap and, in turn, of future real interest rates.
In this section, we consider the case in which the central bank announces
that the policy rate will be fixed for T periods, equal to r̄. As to the natural
rate, we assume that it is at its steady state value 0.3 As it is well known,
an exogenous interest rate path implies equilibrium indeterminacy, while this
does not occur if the forward guidance period has a finite duration and it is
followed by a rule that ensures determinacy. Knowing that, after T periods,
monetary policy will be set in such a way (for example through a Taylor rule),
we follow the methodology in Carlstrom et al. (2015) to characterize the dy-
namics of the economy under the forward guidance period. In particular,
combining the IS curve, the NKPC and the UIP condition inflation dynam-
ics can be expressed through the following second order difference equation
during a period of constant interest rate:
πt = −
κ
σ
r̄ + Γπt+1 − βπt+2, Γ ≡ 1 + β − φ+ δκ+
κ
σ
(5)
with two terminal conditions
πT =
(
φ− δκ− κ
σ
)
r̄ (6)
πT−1 =
(
2 +
κ
σ
+ β − φ+ δκ
)(
φ− δκ− κ
σ
)
r̄ (7)
Notice that the value of Γ collapses to that of Carlstrom et al. (2015) if
we consider a closed-economy. The condition for having a stable inflation
dynamics is that the eigenvalues of (5) are less than one in absolute value4.
3We could also assume that there is a preference shock such that the economy enters
in a liquidity trap, as in the experiment of Carlstrom et al. (2015), but the qualitative
results would not change.
4More recently, Gibbs and McClung (2020) show the sufficient conditions for when
a rational expectations structural model predicts bounded responses of endogenous vari-
ables to forward guidance announcements. The conditions coincide with a special case
of the well-known (E)xpectation-stability conditions that govern when agents can learn a
Rational Expectations Equilibrium
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Name Value for Sweden Value for Spain
β 0.99 0.99
ζ 1 0.25
σ̂ 1 0.78
η 3 3
ϑ 0.75 0.85
ω 0.4 0.25
κ 0.401 0.113
φ 0.057 -0.0038
δ 0.4 -0.1299
σ 1.667 1.045
α 0.25 0.25
Table 1: Calibration
As shown by Carlstrom et al. (2015), in closed economy there is only one
eigenvalue which is inside the unit circle, so the inflation rate explodes expo-
nentially in the duration of forward guidance. We compute these eigenvalues
calibrating the model along the lines of Leitemo and Söderström (2008) and
Mihailov et al. (2011), for a calibrated version of Sweden and Spain, respec-
tively, shown in Table 1. We consider in our simulations a range of values
for the elasticity φ in the interval between -0.26 – 0.47, according to the esti-
mates in Mihailov et al. (2011) to assess if it affects the presence of forward
guidance puzzle. The values of interest for our findings in this section are
given by σ = 1.67, β = 0.99, κ = 0.401 and δ = 0.4, while in the next
section we will also consider the calibrated version for Spain, with σ = 1.045,
β = 0.99, κ = 0.1131 and δ = −0.1299 (see Table 1).5
Since after T all the three endogenous variables are equal to zero, we can
solve the system backwards from the end of the forward guidance regime. It
can be shown that the solution of the difference equation (5) is given by
πt =
κ
σ
r̄
κ
σ
+ φ+ δκ
+m1z
T+1−t
1 +m2z
T+1−t
2 (8)
5The exact value of ρ is not relevant for the evaluation of the stability of the equilibrium.
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where z1 and z2 are the two eigenvalues and the constants m1 and m2 come
from the terminal conditions (6) – (7).
Simulating the model for the values of φ estimated by Mihailov et al.
(2011), we show in Figure 1 that for φ > 0.40, the two roots of (5) are less
than one so that inflation dynamics are stable.6 Analytically, this result can
be understood by writing the relationship (5) as a second-order polynomial
h(w) ≡ w2 − Γw + β.
It can be easily seen that h(0) > 0, while h(1) = −κδ+ φ− κ
σ
< 0 ⇐⇒ φ <
κδ + κ
σ
. Therefore, if h(1) < 0, we know that one eigenvalue is larger than
one in absolute value while the other is less than one. This occurs surely if
the elasticity of inflation with respect to the real exchange rate is negative,
but not for all the positive values that φ can hinge. In particular, for values
of φ > 0.40, the two roots are identical and equal to 0.995, hence we can
conclude that the forward guidance puzzle does not arise.
We now consider the role of frictions in international financial markets in
determining explosive dynamics in endogenous variables. The first friction
we introduce is proportional to excess return on domestic real bonds, as
in Wieland (2012). More specifically, the UIP condition modifies in the
following way:
Etet+1 − et = rt − Etπt+1 − (ft − Etft+1) . (9)
where ft is the friction depending on the excess return on domestic real bonds
through a factor τ :
ft = τ (rt − Etπt+1) . (10)
6More in detail, for φ > 0.40 we find that the roots are complex and to evaluate the
stability of (5) we need to evaluate if
√
(
Γ
2
)2
+
(√
|Γ2−4β|
2
)2
< 1
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Figure 1: Roots of inflation varying the elasticity of inflation with respect to
the real exchange rate
In the case of fixed interest rates and certainty, (9) therefore becomes
et+1 = et + r̄ − (1− τ)πt+1 − τπt+2. (11)
The latter equation, together with the IS and NKPC constitute a system with
unknowns πt, xt and et. Following the methodology previously discussed, it is
possible to derive the inflation dynamics during constant interest rate period
driven by the following second order difference equation:
πt = −
κ
σ
r̄+Γ′πt+1− [β+ τ(φ− δκ)]πt+2 Γ′ ≡ 1+β+(1− τ)(−φ+ δκ)+
κ
σ
.
(12)
When τ > 0 the friction will limit the movement of the terms of trade and
thus the exchange rate relative to the baseline model. In Wieland (2012), the
friction is dependent on central bank’s response coefficient to inflation and
on the probability of entering a zero lower bound episode, denoted by p. In
particular, denoting with φπ the response to inflation in a standard Taylor
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rule, the friction τ is given by
τ =
φπ − 1
φπ − p
.
Therefore, we can think that in normal times (φπ > 1), the real exchange
rate is expected to depreciate when the real interest rate increases, while it
is expected to appreciate under a liquidity trap when τ = p−1. Notice that
(1− p)−1 can be interpreted as the duration of constant interest rate policy
such as forward guidance. Here we consider a regime of fixed interest rate
denoted so that φπ is replaced by r̄, while p is interpreted in terms of a known
duration of forward guidance period. We set r̄ = 101−β
β
(approximately equal
to 10 basis points7) and we let p ∈ [0.1, 0.99] corresponding to a forward
guidance duration of T = (1− p)−1. As a consequence, τ varies between 1−β
β
and 111. The value of φ = 0.0572 comes from the baseline calibration in
Leitemo and Söderström (2008). Figure 2 shows that one root is always in
the unit circle, while the second root is below unity approximately for τ > 20,
so that we can conclude that large frictions in the UIP do not induce forward
guidance puzzle. In terms of duration of fixed interest rates, large frictions
correspond to the case of a very short duration, slightly larger than one
quarter. However, if we increase the size of inflation elasticity with respect to
the real exchange rate, by taking the extremes of the interval used before, we
find that the cases of stability increase dramatically, as shown in Figure 3. In
particular, it can be seen that inflation is always explosive for an intermediate
value of the elasticity (dashed line), while with a negative elasticity (solid
line) it is always stable. Finally, for high and positive elasticity (circled line)
inflation is stable, consistently with what shown in Figure 1.
Recently, Gaĺı (2020) has used convex portfolio adjustments as in Bac-
chetta and Van Wincoop (2019) to explain forward guidance puzzle in open
economy, assuming constant inflation rates. More in detail, the idea of Bac-
chetta and Van Wincoop (2019) is that no arbitrage condition in financial
7This value is chosen without loss of generality to get values easy to show graphically.
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Figure 2: Roots of inflation in the model with frictions in the UIP.
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Figure 3: The potentially explosive root of inflation in the model with fric-
tions in the UIP varying φ.
13
markets is a modified version of the UIP:
Etet+1 − θet + bψet−1 + it − Etπt+1 = 0, (13)
where the lagged term in the real exchange rate depends on the adjustment
costs (otherwise ψ = 0), θ = 1 + bψ + σν2b where ν2 is the variance of the
real exchange rate and b ∈ [0.25, 0.1875] is a parameter related to the degree
of home bias. Due to the adjustment costs, the solution during the period
with forward guidance is characterized by four eigenvalues: according to our
calibrated values, taken from the previous analysis and from Bacchetta and
Van Wincoop (2019), two eigenvalues are outside the unit circle, hence in
this case we have forward guidance puzzle.8
4 Forward guidance with stochastic duration
Now we consider a stochastic version of the model where also the duration of
forward guidance is stochastic. In doing that, we will first consider a special
case, isomorphic to closed economy and then we will study a more general
version where analytical solutions become cumbersome.
4.1 Analytical solution for a special case
In this section we derive the solution for a special case of the model. In
particular, we consider a version isomorphic to the closed–economy model,
as in Gali and Monacelli (2005).9 Analytically, this setup can be obtained
by setting δσ̂ = (1−ω)(1−2ω). In such a case we can focus only on the new
Keynesian Phillips curve and the IS curve respectively
8In particular, the values taken from Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2019) are ψ = 15,
b = 0.25 and ν = 0.0271. Also changing some of these values or the value of φ we have an
explosive dynamics. Computational details are available upon request.
9More in detail, Gali and Monacelli (2005) consider such a setup to derive a computa-
tionally easy version of welfare-based loss function.
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πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt, (14)
xt = Etxt+1 −
1
σ
(it − Etπt+1 − ρt) . (15)
while the UIP condition (4) can be treated separately from the two other
equations above. As already said before, with the objective of characterizing
a relatively simple solution, we are not considering other shocks different
from shocks to the natural rate ρt. Due to the isomorphism of the model to
closed economy, we can solve for inflation and output gap separately from
the real exchange rate.
We assume that the central bank performs a forward guidance exercise
where it is fully credible. As in Bilbiie (2019), we model forward guidance
stochastically through a Markov chain as a state of the world with a prob-
ability distribution of p for the liquidity trap to happen. Consequently the
expected stochastic duration of the liquidity trap is TL = (1 − p)−1 which
is the stopping time of the Markov chain. ρt is following Markov chain of 3
states, one first state is the steady state S where ρt = ρ and once reached,
there is a probability 1 of staying there. The second state is the liquidity trap,
being transitory, denoted by L where rt = 0 and ρt = ρL < 0 with persistence
probability p. After this time TL, the CB sets rt = 0 while ρt = ρ > 0, with
probability q. The probability to move back to steady state from F is 1− q.
We denote this state F , with expected duration TF = (1 − q)−1. Therefore,
we have the following three states of the world:
1. Liquidity trap L, with rt = 0 and ρt = ρL. The economy remains in this
state with probability p and arrives to the state of forward guidance
with probability (1− p)q.
2. Forward guidance F , with rt = 0 and ρt = ρ. The economy is in
this state with probability q and goes back to the steady state with
probability 1− q.
3. Steady state S with rt = ρt = ρ (absorbing state).
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Given these assumptions, we can write the following expectations for our
endogenous variables:
Etxt+1 = pxL + (1− p)qxF ,
Etπt+1 = pπL + (1− p)qπF .
Following the methodology in Bilbiie (2019), we first solve for the state
F and then for the state L. In state F we must solve the following system
in xF and πF :
πF = βqπF + κxF , (16)
xF = qxF −
1
σ
(−qπF − ρ) . (17)
From (16) we can obtain πF which, combined with (17) gives us
xF = qxF −
1
σ
(
− qκ
1− βqxF − ρ
)
.
Solving the previous expression and remembering the relationship with πF
we get the following pair of values for the state F :
xF =
1− βq
σ(1− q)(1− βq)− qκρ, (18)
πF =
κ
σ(1− q)(1− βq)− qκρ. (19)
Now we consider the state of the world L. In this case the system to solve
becomes:
xL = pxL + (1− p)qxF −
1
σ
(−pπL − (1− p)qπF − ρL) ,
πL = βpπL + β(1− p)qπF + κxL.
From the second equation we can get πL =
βq(1−p)πF+κxL
1−βp
, plug it into xL and
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solve for it to get
xL =
(1− βp)
[σ (1− p) (1− βp)− κp]ρL+
q (1− p) [κ+ σ (1− βq) (1− βp)]
[σ (1− p) (1− βp)− κp] [σ (1− βq) (1− q)− qκ]ρ.
(20)
After finding the value of xL, we can compute πL
πL =
1− p
σ(1− p)(1− βp)− pκ
{
κ
1− pρL +
1− βq + κ[σβq(1− p) + κp]
σ(1− βq)(1− q)− qκ ρ
}
,
(21)
and work on the UIP equation to find the solution for the real exchange
rate. In particular, since we are considering a model with full–risk sharing
and unitary elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods,
we can decouple the solution for the real exchange rate from the solution for
inflation and output gap. The solution for the real exchange rate in the two
states come from the following system:
eF = qeF + πF , (22)
eL = peL + (1− p)qeF + pπL + (1− p)qπF . (23)
It is possible to show the solutions for the exchange rate in the forward
guidance state and under a liquidity trap respectively10:
eF =
κ
σ(1− q)2(1− βq)− qκρ, (24)
eL =
qκ
σ(1− q)2(1− βq)− qκρ+
p
σ(1− p)(1− βp)− pκ
{
κ
1− pρL +
1− βq + κ[σβq(1− p) + κp]
σ(1− βq)(1− q)− qκ ρ
}
+
+
qκ
σ(1− q)(1− βq)− qκρ, (25)
In order to derive sharper analytical conditions, we consider the same special
10In the L state, we use the fact that eL = qeF +
p
1−pπL + qπF .
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case of Bilbiie (2019), namely β = 0. In particular, the effect of forward
guidance duration on output gap is positive for a critical value of q:
∂xF
∂q
=
σ + κ
(σ(1− q)− qκ)2ρ =
σ + κ
σ(1− q)− qκxF > 0 ⇐⇒ q <
σ
σ + κ
. (26)
Taking into account the relationship of πF with xF , we can conclude that
forward guidance determines output and inflation expansion, together with
real depreciation. In open economy movements in the exchange rate have
two competing effects. On the one hand, a real exchange rate depreciation
increases CPI inflation. The consequent reduction in real wage induces firms
to increase nominal wages, which, in turn, determines an increase in marginal
costs and inflation. On the other hand, an exchange rate depreciation leads
to a decrease in the demand for imports and therefore a reduction in aggre-
gate consumption. Since the marginal rate of substitution falls, real wages
and marginal cost decrease. The final effect on inflation will depend on which
of the two effects is stronger. However, in the case analyzed here, the two
effects offset and the exchange rate movements do not affect inflation. Simi-
larly, there are two competing effects that exchange rate produces on output.
On the one hand, an exchange rate depreciation raises real interest rate, de-
creasing consumption. On the other hand, an exchange rate depreciation
increases exports and therefore output. Again, for the case under scrutiny
here, these two effects are the same and the exchange rate dynamics do not
affect output. In this model, therefore, even if we observe real depreciation,
there is not a transmission of it to the real variables and closed-economy
results apply also in open economy. However, if we abandon the assumption
of unitary elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, this
mechanism does not work: real exchange rate becomes another endogenous
variable that cannot be decoupled from output and inflation. Therefore,
there is an open economy channel that affects monetary policy transmission.
As to the capacity of forward guidance to reduce the effects of liquidity
trap, we have:
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∂xL
∂q
=
σ(1− p)
σ(1− p)− pκ
[
(1 + κ)
σ(1− q)− qκρ+ q
(
∂xF
∂q
+
∂πF
∂q
)]
. (27)
To understand the effect of forward guidance on output in state L, pro-
vided that(26) holds, a similar condition on p (p < σ
σ+κ
) is sufficient to
guarantee that output gap in state L is increasing in q. In such a case, more
forward guidance leads to larger output gap, inflation and real exchange rate
depreciation (the latter two move in the same direction as output). Moreover,
the model exhibits forward guidance puzzle since11
∂2xL
∂q∂p
=
σ2(κ+ σ)
[σ(1− q)− qκ]2[σ(1− p)− pκ]2ρ > 0. (29)
The previous analysis shows that, in presence of unitary substitution
between domestic and foreign goods, forward guidance implies a rise in do-
mestic output gap accompanied by a depreciation in the real exchange rate
if condition (26) holds.
We compute some simulations for this version of the model isomorphic to
closed economy. In doing that, we consider a value for the Phillips curve slope
κ = 0.02, which is more or less between the two values for Sweden and Spain
summarized in Table 1. Such a value is similar to what used by Bilbiie (2019).
Moreover, we compute the equilibrium with β = 0 or β = 0.99 for the more
general case where analytical results are more complicated. Finally, we set
the probability of being in a liquidity trap p = 0.8, ρ = 0.01 and ρL = −0.01.
Given our calibration, the threshold condition (26) requires q < 0.98, hence
we can say that for all the values considered in our simulation for q we
obtain, for the case β = 0, that the three endogenous variables are increasing
in the size of the forward guidance duration. In the more general case of
11This result derives from another way to derive the effect of larger q on xL
∂xL
∂q
=
(κ+ σ)(1− p)σρ
[σ(1− p)− κp][σ(1− q)− qκ]2 > 0. (28)
Then you can compute from (28) the effect of forward guidance in a liquidity trap.
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β different from zero, and more specifically β = 0.99, the condition that
guarantees expansionary effect of forward guidance becomes more complex.
In particular, it can be easily shown that expansionary effects occur whenever
the following condition holds
σ(1− q)(1− βq) > qκ.
The latter inequality implies that analytically there are two values for q that
guarantee that forward guidance raises output, inflation and real exchange
rate. However, provided that q must be lower than one, we find numerically
that the only admissible value for q is q < 0.87 for Sweden, while for Spain
we have q < 0.75.12
For the case β = 0.99, represented in figures 4–5, in the state F , we can
observe that the variables barely move while they respond much more for
large value of q (specifically, for q > 0.8). Under a liquidity trap, we observe
a similar path, with a larger response of the three variables when q is close
to 0.8. Interestingly, forward guidance is not monotonically expansionary, in
fact after q = 0.87, we observe deflation associated with an appreciation and
a recession.
This may suggest that there could be a level of forward guidance under a
liquidity trap that closes the gaps in the endogenous variables. In particular,
it is possible to derive the value of q, labelled q0, that implies zero output
gap. Given the isomorphic structure to the closed economy that we are
considering, the value that closes the output gap is very close (up to some
different definition in the structural equations) to that derived in Bilbiie
(2019) in the case of β = 013. Even if q0 is able to close also the inflation
12This value corresponds to the lowest solution of the expression, given by
κ+(1+β)σ−
√
[κ+(1+β)σ]2−4βσ2
2βσ .
13In particular, this value for q0 is given by
q0 =
σ∆L
1− p+∆L(κ+ σ)
∆L ≡ −
ρL
ρ
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Figure 4: Output gap (solid line), inflation (circle line) and real exchange
rate (dashed line) during forward guidance (β = 0.99).
gap, this arrives at the cost of fluctuations in the real exchange rate. This
analysis confirms that the value derived for q0 is not optimal, because it does
not take into account future costs of forward guidance in state F , as in closed
economy, but also because closing inflation and output gaps come at the cost
of haing real exchange rate volatility. As long as we have complete markets,
fluctuations in the real exchange rate probably do not affect welfare losses.
As highlighted by De Paoli (2009), under complete markets and unitary
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, the dynamics
of the small open economy are independent of the asset market structure.
In such a case, the flexible price equilibrium is optimal and, absent markup
shocks, a policy of complete domestic price stabilization closes the welfare
relevant output gap. However, this is not the case when we abandon the
assumption of unitary elasticity of substitution: in such a case the central
bank should care about real exchange rate variability. In Section 4.3, we will
focus on a more general version of the small-open economy model, breaking
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Figure 5: Output gap (solid line), inflation (circle line) and real exchange
rate (dashed line) during LT (β = 0.99).
the isomorphism assumed here. In doing this, we highlight the different
transmission mechanism through i) closed versus open economy, and ii) on
the nature of the exchange-rate pass-through on inflation.
4.2 Observing marginal effects: A special case with a
contemporaneous Phillips curve
Here we consider a model with contemporaneous Phillips curve (i.e. β = 0)
to characterize analytically how exchange rate passthrough and duration of
the policy affect the transmission of forward guidance.
These three above equations remain positive for q 6 0.84 for the Swedish
economy setup, where φ = 0.057, and for q 6 0.91 for the Spanish economic
setup, where φ = −0.0038. To observe, respectively, the net effect of φ
and q on inflation, the output gap and the exchange rate, we calculate the
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derivatives14.
Marginal effect of pass-through. Here we study the effect of an
increase in the exchange-rate pass-through in the Phillips curve. We show
analytically that an increase in the exchange-rate pass-through in the Phillips
curve, φ, always yields higher inflation, a higher output gap and the depre-
ciation of the exchange rate, everything else being equal.
∂πF
∂φ
=
κqσ
[σ (1− q)− κq + φqσ]2
ρ > 0,
∂xF
∂φ
=
qσ
[σ (1− q)− κq + φqσ]2
ρ > 0,
∂eF
∂φ
=
κq2σ
[σ (1− q)− κq + φqσ]2
ρ > 0.
In state L, we have ∂πL
∂φ
= σβq(1−p)
2
σ(1−p)(1−βp)−κp
∂πF
∂φ
> 0 if and only if σ (1− p) (1−
βp) − κp > 0. The same condition guarantees that also output gap and
exchange rate are increasing in φ15. Also in state L, a higher exchange rate
pass-through in absolute value leads to stronger response of the variables,
confirming the above observation: forward guidance is more expansionary in
open economy, when the condition σ (1− p) (1 − βp) − κp > 0 holds, and
its effect becomes even larger if the exchange rate pass-through is high in
absolute value, due to the greater effect of depreciation on activity and thus
on aggregate demand.
Marginal effect of forward guidance duration. We now want to see
in this simplified model with contemporaneous Phillips curve if the forward
guidance duration also produces different effects depending on the state the
economy is currently in. The longer the forward guidance, the higher inflation
and output gap are, where ∂πF
∂q
and ∂xF
∂q
are positive if and only if σ(1−φ)+κ
14Further explanations can be found in section 2 before the IS equation.
15The derivatives are ∂xL
∂φ
= p
σ(1−p)
∂πL
∂φ
> 0 and ∂eL
∂φ
= p(1−p)
∂πL
∂φ
+
σκq2(1−q)
(1−q)2[σ(1−q)+q(κ−σφ)]2
ρ > 0.
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is positive, which is always true for our calibration setups. As to the effect on
the exchange rate, we will have a depreciation when σ+ q2 (φσ − σ − κ) > 0,
which occurs for q < 0.92 in our set-up for Sweden with negative exchange-
rate pass-through and for q < 0.96 in the set up for Spain. Therefore, we
could conclude that this effect is the one observed in our analysis.
This would be equivalent to a depreciation after 25 quarters of forward
guidance in countries (like Spain) characterized by a positive exchange rate
pass-through and 12.5 quarters (over 3 years) for countries like Sweden with
a negative exchange rate pass-through. We can thus deduce that staying too
long in a forward guidance can trigger a long period of currency depreciation
for the economy, but it takes more time to observe the currency depreciation
when the exchange rate pass-through is positive.16
We now focus our interest on the liquidity trap state and the effect of a
movement in q on the state variables. We use the expressions for inflation,
the output gap and the exchange rate given in Appendix (30-32). We first
compute the derivatives of equations (30)-(32) with respect to q. In the
Appendix we present the marginal effects analytically: in general terms we
can conclude that the necessary condition for ∂πF
∂q
and ∂xF
∂q
to be positive is
sufficient for ∂πL
∂q
and ∂eL
∂q
to be positive whereas ∂xL
∂q
> 0 is always positive
for any calibration. A positive ∂xF
∂q
is sufficient for ∂πL
∂q
> 0 and ∂eL
∂q
> 0 to
be positive whereas ∂xL
∂q
is always positive for any calibration when β = 017.
To sum up, in the simplified version of the model, according to our cal-
ibrated exercises, forward guidance in a liquidity trap always has a positive
effect on inflation and output gap and it induces a real depreciation.
16 ∂πF
∂q
= κ[σ+κ−φσ]
[σ(1−q)−κq+φqσ]2
ρ > 0, ∂xF
∂q
= σ+κ−φσ
[σ(1−q)−κq+φqσ]2
ρ > 0 and ∂eF
∂q
=
κ{σ+q2(φσ−σ−κ)}
(1−q)2[σ(1−q)−κq+φqσ]2
ρ > 0.
17 ∂πL
∂q
> 0 if and only if σ (1− φ) + κ (1 + δσ) > 0, then ∂xL
∂q
> 0 ⇔ q2 > − σ[κ−σ(1+φ)] ,
which is always true and finally ∂eL
∂q
> 0 ⇔ κ > σφ. If the condition on the sign of ∂eL
∂q
holds, then the sign of ∂πL
∂q
is always positive.
24
4.3 Forward Guidance for a general version of the model
Here we compute the value of inflation, output gap and real exchange rate
for a general version of the model, since in the previous sections we made
some simplifying assumptions in terms of contemporaneous Phillips curve
or isomorphism to closed–economy. Even if it is still possible to solve the
model analytically, computation becomes cumbersome, and we decide just to
describe the equilibrium outcomes without reporting here the exact analytical
expressions.
A natural question that arises is if forward guidance is more or less effec-
tive in open economy. Figure 6 shows the value of inflation and output gap,
both in state F and in state L, for the open–economy case (with φ = 0.0572,
as for Sweden, circled lines) and for the closed–economy case (solid line),
varying the probability of forward guidance q. The graph shows that in state
F forward guidance is more expansionary in open economy: we interpret this
result by looking at the Phillips’ curve slope and interest rate elasticity of the
output gap (σ and κ respectively), which are larger than in closed economy.
The other factor explaining the more expansionary effect in open economy is
the exchange rate depreciation which boosts aggregate demand. Moreover,
in closed economy a shorter period of forward guidance (0 < q < 0.5) is suf-
ficient for the economy to reach the largest expansion for output in normal
times.
On the other hand, in state L, the path followed by output gap and
inflation presents more differences across open and closed economy. While
in closed economy the effect is almost muted up to approximately before
q = 0.5 and then we observe a through followed by a peak, in open economy
the effect is globally more expansionary (as already discussed for state F )
and the troughs are sensibly lower. More in detail, the economy experiences
a peak for q = 0.65, then we observe a decrease with inflation and output
gap going into negative territory. Again, there is a key contribution of the
real exchange rate: when it appreciates the economy enters in a deflation
and a recession. We now consider the role of exchange rate pass-through in
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Figure 6: Comparison of forward guidance between open and closed economy.
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Figure 7: Inflation level for different φ corresponding to distinct economies:
Spain (φ = −0.0038, solid line), and Sweden (φ = 0.057, dashed line).
determining these findings.
In the forward guidance experiment shown Figures 7–9, the variables
evolve in the same direction whether the economy has a positive or a nega-
tive exchange rate pass-through. In state F , the largest exchange rate depre-
ciation, obtained between 0.6 ≤ q < 0.7 goes hand-in-hand with a peak in
inflation and output gap for the case of a positive exchange rate pass-through
(dashed line). For the case of Spain, i.e negative exchange rate pass-through,
we observe that we should at least engineer a forward guidance duration of
2.5 quarters to obtain a response of the exchange rate that depreciates in a
small interval between 0.6 < q < 0.7. Also in this case, the depreciation is
associated with an expansion of output gap and inflation. Overall, the effect
of forward guidance policy for Spain are lower compared to Sweden because
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of the much lower exchange rate pass-through18.
As to the effects of forward guidance in a liquidity trap, as in the previous
case, the response of the three variables becomes sizable for values of q ≥ 0.6.
However, under liquidity trap, inflation in Sweden is characterized by a peak
and then it does not move substantially, while for Spain we observe that
there is a trough (more or less when there is the peak for Sweden), followed
by a peak and then inflation remains positive. Output gap moves in the
same direction for both countries, while the real exchange rate depreciates
significantly but temporarily only for the case of a larger exchange rate pass-
trough.
Overall, these results confirm that the exchange rate pass-through is a key
variable. A forward guidance policy determines a depreciation of domestic
currency which raises domestic consumer prices and reduces the real wage for
a given nominal wage. Given households’ marginal rate of substitution be-
tween leisure and consumption, households supply less labor and enjoy more
leisure. Therefore firms must increase the real wage to offset the reduction
in the households’ real wage, leading to higher marginal cost and inflation.
Meanwhile, the depreciation increases the relative price of foreign goods in
terms of domestic goods, which makes domestic goods more attractive. Do-
mestic activity is stimulated, which strengthens inflationary pressures in the
case of a positive (and relatively much larger in absolute value) exchange rate
pass-through. Under liquidity trap, we have cases with small pass-through
in which output gap expansion is larger than the case of high pass-through
but the role played by exchange rate movements is not relevant.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies forward guidance in a theoretical DSGE small open econ-
omy. We show that the elasticity of inflation to the real exchange rate is a
18Moreover, if we calibrate the economy using the data for for Spain, we could show
that forward guidance turns out to be more expansionary in closed economy.
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key variable in limiting the implausible overreaction of inflation and output
gap to periods of fixed interest rate. When the duration of forward guid-
ance is stochastic, the expansionary effect of the policy is positively related
to the exchange rate pass-through and larger than in the closed economy
counterpart because of a better inflation-output trade-off and the exchange
rate channel. These findings generally hold also in the case in which forward
guidance is implemented during a liquidity trap.
Our analysis suggests that a small-open economy model can produce more
reasonable dynamics without recurring to the assumptions typically used in
the literature to correct the forward-guidance puzzle, such as sticky infor-
mation, incomplete markets and perpetual youth. Several extensions to our
setup can be considered. First, we do not analyze optimal forward guidance
and in particular how it is related to the open economy dimension. Second,
with incomplete information set available to the central bank, there might be
an attenuation of the forward guidance puzzle. Finally, we have abstracted
from fiscal shocks and on how the interaction between monetary and fiscal
policy modifies the transmission of forward guidance. We leave these ques-
tions for future research.
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A Effects of forward guidance in liquidity trap
Calculations in liquidity trap
πL =
κq (1− p)2 [σ (1− φ) + κ (1 + δσ)]
{σ [(1− q) + qφ]− κq} {σ (1− p) [1− p (1− pφ)]− κp (1− p) + δκp2σ}ρ
+
κ (1− p) {σ [(1− q) + qφ]− κq}
{σ [(1− q) + qφ]− κq} {σ (1− p) [1− p (1− pφ)]− κp (1− p) + δκp2σ}ρL
xL =
q (1− q)
{
κ (1− p)2 + σ (1− p)2
}
+ q(1− q)δκσ
[
(1− p)2 + pφ
]
(1− q) [σ(1− q)− κq + φqσ]
[
σ (1− p)2 − κp (1− p) + pφσ (1− p) + δκp2σ
]ρ
+
φpq
{
κ(1 + p− q) + σ
[
−p (1− q)2 − 3q + φq (1− p) + δκpq
]}
+ φp2σ
(1− q) [σ(1− q)− κq + φqσ]
[
σ (1− p)2 − κp (1− p) + pφσ (1− p) + δκp2σ
]ρ
+
[
σ (1− q)2 + κq2
]
(1− p) + κpq + φ (1− q) [σp (1− q) + σq (1− p)− pq (κ− φσ)]
(1− q) [σ(1− q)− κq + φqσ]
[
σ (1− p)2 − κp (1− p) + pφσ (1− p) + δκp2σ
] ρL
⇒ eL =
κq
(1− q) [σ (1− q) + q (κ− σφ)]ρ
+
κpq (1− p) [σ (1− φ) + κ (1 + δσ)]
[σ (1− q) + q (κ− σφ)] {σ (1− p) [1− p (1− pφ)]− κp (1− p) + δκp2σ}ρ
+
κp
{σ (1− p) [1− p (1− pφ)]− κp (1− p) + δκp2σ}ρL
Derivatives in liquidity trap We now focus our interest on the liquidity
trap state and the effect of a movement in q or φ on the state variables, in
the absence of shocks. We use the definitions for inflation, the output gap
and the exchange rate given in Appendix.
πL =
κq (1− p)2 [σ (1− φ) + κ (1 + δσ)]
{σ [(1− q) + qφ]− κq} {(1− p) [σ (1− p) + σp2φ− κp] + δκp2σ}ρ
+
κ (1− p) [σ (1− q)− q (κ− φσ)]
{σ [(1− q) (1− βq) + qφ]− κq} {(1− p) [σ (1− p) + σp2φ− κp] + δκp2σ}ρL(30)
32
xL =
q
σ (1− q)
(
κ+ σ (1− q) + q (κ− σφ)
[σ (1− q) + q (κ− σφ)]
)
ρ
+
p
σ (1− p)πL +
1
σ (1− p)ρL (31)
eL =
p
(1− p)πL +
κq
(1− q) [σ (1− q) + q (κ− σφ)]ρ (32)
∂πL
∂q
=
σκ (1− p)2 [σ (1− φ) + κ (1 + δσ)]
{σ [(1− q) + qφ]− κq}2 {σ (1− p) [1− p (1− pφ)]− κp (1− p) + δκp2σ}
ρ
> 0 if and only if
σ (1− φ) + κ (1 + δσ) > 0
∂xL
∂q
=
1
σ (1− q)2
(
1 +
κ [σ + q2 (κ− σ (1 + φ))]
[σ (1− q) + q (κ− σφ)]2
)
ρ (33)
+
p
σ (1− p)
∂πL
∂q
∂xL
∂q
> 0 ⇔ σ + q2κ > q2σ (1 + φ)
∂eL
∂q
=
p
(1− p)
∂πL
∂q
+ κ
σ (1− q2) + q2 (κ− σφ)
(1− q)2 [σ (1− q) + q (κ− σφ)]2
ρ (34)
∂eL
∂q
> 0 ⇔ κ > σφ
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